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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in denying
Mr. Velarde's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

TEXT OF STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution
provides in pertinent part:
Section 1.
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . .
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-ll(e) (1982 and Supp. 1986)
provides:
(e) The court . . . shall not accept such a
[guilty] plea until the court has made the
findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial and to
confront and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him, and that by entering
the plea he waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands
the nature and elements of the offense to
which he is entering the plea; that upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden
of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence that may be
imposed upon him for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a
result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement and if so, what agreement has been
reached.

v

If it appears that the prosecuting attorney
or any other party has agreed to request or
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser
included offense, or the dismissal of other
charges, the same shall be approved by the court.
If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by
the court/ the court shall advise the defendant
personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.

vi

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(b ) (1953 as amended) and §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1986)
whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may take an
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a conviction and final judgment
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.
Mr. Velarde pled guilty to a third degree felony and thereafter moved
to withdraw his guilty plea.

The Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge,

Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denied
defendant's motion; this appeal arises from the denial of that motion.

vii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880211-CA
Priority No. 2

JERRY LEE VELARDE,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 24, 1984, appellant/defendant JERRY LEE
VELARDE pled guilty to Attempted Mayhem, a third degree felony.
Mr. Velarde thereafter moved to withdraw his guilty plea.

Judge

Raymond S. Uno denied that motion after hearings held on August 31,
1987; February 8, 1988; and September 12, 1988.

Mr. Velarde appeals

the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 24, 1984, Mr. Velarde pled guilty to Attempted
Mayhem, a third degree felony (R. 16-18).

At the time he entered

his plea, he had been convicted of second degree homicide, a first
degree felony, and sentenced to serve five years to life at the Utah
State Prison (Transcript of Hearing held August 31, 1987,
hereinafter TA, at 10).
Although Mr. Velarde had a defense to the charge of
Mayhem, he pled guilty because he believed it would have little
impact on the amount of time he would serve in prison since he was
already serving five years to life on the murder conviction

(TA. 8, 11). On December 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court reversed
Mr. Velarde's murder conviction and he subsequently pled guilty to
Manslaughter (TA. 8).
Thereafter, Mr. Velarde moved to withdraw his plea of
guilty to Attempted Mayhem based on his incorrect understanding of
the consequences of that plea and the trial judge's failure to
comply with Utah Code Ann, §77-35-ll(e) and the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment in accepting that plea.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Velarde's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

The guilty plea was taken in violation o

due process and Rule 11(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (1982
and Supp. 1986).

Furthermore, the plea was not knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily made since Mr. Velarde did not
understand its consequences.

ARGUMENT
POINT: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IS
DENYING MR. VELARDE'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA,
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1953 as amended) permits a plea
of guilty to be withdrawn upon good cause and with the leave of the
court.

An appellate court will reverse a trial court's denial of a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea "when it clearly appears the trial
court has abused its discretion."

State v. Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d

92, 93 (Utah App. 1988) (pet. cert, denied) citing State v.
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987).
A. MR. VELARDE DID NOT KNOWINGLY,
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS PLEA
OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED MAYHEM.
Good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea may be
established by demonstrating that the plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily.
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987).

See State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d

In Gallegos, the Utah Supreme Court

reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea where the State's witness recanted her
preliminary hearing testimony after the defendant entered his guilty
plea.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23
L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the United States Supreme Court clarified that
the record must establish that a plea of guilty was intelligently
and voluntarily made and the trial judge has the responsibility of
making an adequate record of the defendant's waiver of his
constitutional rights. Where the record does not disclose that the
defendant intelligently and voluntarily entered his guilty plea, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution is violated.
For a guilty plea to be made knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently, the defendant must understand the nature of the
charge against him, the elements of the crime charged, the
relationship of the law to the facts, and the possible consequences
of the guilty plea.

See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
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1987).

In State v. Cutler, 590 P.2d 444 (Ariz. 1979), the Arizona

Supreme Court delineated the components of an adequate plea:
For a plea to be intelligently made, a defendant
must thoroughly understand its consequences.
Moreover, in order for a plea to be deemed
voluntary, the defendant must be aware of its
ramifications and must be apprised of the range of
sentence that he could face and of the rights he
will forfeit. Therefore, if the defendant does
not have a proper understanding of what can happen
as a result of his plea, it is not voluntarily
made and is void.
_Id. at 445-6.
In determining whether the defendant understood the
consequences of entering a plea of guilty to a charge, courts often
consider whether a defendant understood the minimum and maximum
possible penalty and the potential for consecutive sentences if the
defendant had been convicted of another crime.

See e.g.

Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d at 95.
In State v. Copeland, No. 860491, slip op. (Utah
December 6, 1988), the Utah Supreme Court vacated the defendant's
sentence and remanded the case to the trial court in part for
additional findings regarding the defendant's guilty plea.

In

Copeland, the defendant claimed that he misunderstood the basis of
the State's sentencing recommendation.

The Copeland court quoted

the United States Supreme Court holding in Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970) at 13:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of
the direct consequences, including the actual
value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harrassment), misrepresentation
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(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises),
or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
The court then cited the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975),
and concluded "Brady and Hammond require that in order for a plea to
be voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the
nature and value of any promises made to him."

Copeland, slip op.

at 14. Because the nature of the State's recommendation and the
defendant's understanding regarding that recommendation were not
clear, the court remanded the case with instructions that the
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea under certain
circumstances.
In the instant case, Mr. Velarde did not understand the
consequences of his guilty plea and therefore the plea was not
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.

When Mr. Velarde

entered the guilty plea, he understood that the conviction would
have little impact on the time he spent in prison since he was
already serving a sentence of five years to life for a second degree
murder conviction.

Believing that the sentence of zero to five

years would not significantly affect the amount of time he spent in
prison, Mr. Velarde pled guilty even though he had a defense to the
charge.
When Mr. Velarde's murder conviction was reversed, the
basis for entering the guilty plea to Attempted Mayhem was removed
and Mr. Velarde's understanding of the consequences of his guilty
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plea proved to be incorrect.

Hence, Mr. Velarde's plea was not made

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution and Rule 11(e), and the trial court abused its
discretion in not permitting him to withdraw the plea.
Furthermore, the policy of the Board of Pardons changed
so that Mr. Velarde's understanding of the consequences of entering
his plea was erroneous (TA. 9-10).
B. THE GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-ll(e) (1982 AND SUPP.
1986).
Where a plea was entered in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-ll(e) (1982 and Supp. 1986), good cause may exist for
withdrawal of that plea.

See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah

1987); Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d at 95. Rule 11(e) outlines the
procedure to be followed by a trial court in accepting a guilty
plea.

It provides:
(e) The court . . . shall not accept such a
[guilty] plea until the court has made the
findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial and to confront and
cross-examine in open court the witnesses
against him, and that by entering the plea he
waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
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doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence that may be
imposed upon him for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a
result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement and if so, what agreement has been
reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney
or any other party has agreed to request or
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser
included offense, or the dismissal of other
charges, the same shall be approved by the court.
If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by
the court, the court shall advise the defendant
personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
In Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and its
companion case, Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court reviewed the record as a whole to determine whether
the trial court accepted the guilty pleas in violation of Rule
11(e).

The test for determining whether the rule was violated was

to consider whether the record as a whole "affirmatively establishes
that the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the rights he was
waiving . . ."

Warner, 709 P.2d at 310; Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311.

In both cases, the trial judge questioned the defendant to determine
whether the plea was being made intelligently and voluntarily but
failed to ask specifically whether the defendant waived his right
against self-incrimination.

In each case, the Court determined that

the record as a whole established that the defendant understood the
rights he was waiving and the consequences of his plea.
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In State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Brooks and Warner that the
record as a whole must be reviewed to determine whether the plea was
taken in violation of Rule 11(e).

^Id. at 405.

In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court outlined "a statement
of law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts in
this state . . ."

Ld. at 1312. The Court pointed out that n[r]ule

11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a
guilty plea is entered."

j[d at 1312.

The Court emphasized that

trial judges cannot rely on defense counsel to ensure that a
defendant understands the rights he is waiving and the consequences
of entering a guilty plea but instead must review with the defendant
any statement in an affidavit signed as part of the entry of the
guilty plea, "question the defendant concerning his understanding of
it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by §77-35-11 on the
record before accepting the guilty plea.

If the Court does not use

an affidavit, the requirement set forth above and in §77-35-11 must
still be followed and be on the record."

_Ic3. at 1314.

1. The Gibbons Standard Applies to This
Case and Requires Reversal of the Trial
Court's Denial of the Defendant's Motion
to Withdraw the Guilty Plea.
The trial judge seemed to deny the motion to withdraw in
part based on his belief that Gibbons should not be applied
retroactively to this case.
September 12, 1988 at 10.)

(Transcript of Hearing held
(See Addendum A for transcript of
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judge's ruling.)

In Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d at 94, this Court

reached a similar conclusion, stating that "the strict Rule 11(e)
compliance standard established under Gibbons in 1987 does not
apply" to a case where the defendant entered his guilty plea prior
to the Gibbons decision.

Mr. Velarde respectfully requests that

this Court reconsider its determination that Gibbons does not apply
to guilty pleas entered prior to the date of the decision.1
Rule 11(e) was in effect and controlled the acceptance of
guilty pleas at the time Mr. Velarde pled guilty to Attempted
Mayhem.

Warner, Brooks and Miller contained very short discussions

of the rule.

In Gibbons, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to

outline at length "a statement of the law concerning the taking of
guilty pleas in all trial courts . . . "

Gibbons therefore explains

and clarifies Rule 11(e).
The responsibility of the trial judge to discuss with the
defendant on the record the details of his constitutional rights and
to obtain a valid affirmative waiver thereof on the record did not
arise with the Gibbons decision.

In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at

242, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The requirement that the prosecution spread on the
record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no
constitutional innovation.
1 The approach of the Utah Supreme Court when dealing
with retroactivity issues is not clear. Although in Andrews v.
Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 88-91 (Utah 1983) the Court embraced the "clear
break" rule discussed in United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102
S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), the United States Supreme Court
altered its position on retroactivity in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S.
, 107 S.Ct.
, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). Although Griffith
is not controlling, it does provide guidance for the Utah Supreme
Court on retroactivity issues.
- 9 _

Such a responsibility is also implicit in the language of Rule 11(e)
and alluded to in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253,
49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), which was decided well before the entry of
the disputed guilty plea in this case.
Finally, in both Brooks and Warner, the trial judge
carefully examined appellant to insure that the plea was
intelligently and voluntarily entered (Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311) or
conducted a question and answer session which "followed the litany
required by Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(e) . . ." Warner,
709 P.2d at 310. Hence, pursuant to Rule 11(e), as applicable at
the time the trial court accepted the plea in Mr. Velarde's case and
the due process clause of the federal constitution, the trial judge
had a responsibility to examine Mr. Velarde on the record to
determine whether he understood his constitutional rights and
voluntarily waived them and could not rely on defense counsel to
carry out that responsibility.
A review of Gibbons and the transcript of the hearing
where the guilty plea was entered clarifies that the trial judge did
not follow the dictates of Rule 11(e) in accepting Mr. Velarde's
guilty plea and therefore good cause exists for allowing withdrawal
of that plea.

The Supreme Court clarified in Gibbons that a trial

judge has the responsibility to discuss the specific rights being
waived with the defendant on the record as well as the consequences
of entering the plea and not rely on defense counsel to convey that
information to a defendant.

Gibbons, 740 P*2d at 1313.

- 10 -

In the present case, the trial judge did not question
Mr. Velarde regarding his understanding of his rights and waiver
thereof as required by Rule 11(e).

Instead, he relied on defense

counsel to explain to Mr. Velarde his constitutional rights and
their waiver.

The trial judge asked "[h]ave you gone over your

constitutional rights and waiver thereof as set forth in your
affidavit?"

Transcript of plea hearing dated January 24, 1984

(hereinafter TP) at 2.

Entire transcript of hearing is contained in

Addendum 3.
When the defendant answered affirmatively, the judge
asked n[d]o you understand those rights you are waiving?"

Id.

Hence, the trial judge made no attempt to discuss Mr. Velarde's
constitutional rights with him or his waiver thereof, in violation
of Rule 11(e) (3).
Rule 11(e)(4) requires that the trial court make findings
that "the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering the plea."

Gibbons clarifies that

"the defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged
and the relationship of the law to the facts."
1312.

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at

In the instant case, the trial judge made no attempt to

ascertain whether Mr. Velarde understood the elements of the charge
of Attempted Mayhem nor the relationship to the facts.

Instead, the

trial judge repeated from the statements contained in the amended
Information, then asked Mr. Velarde for a plea.
The Court: All right. To the included offense of
Attempted Mayhem, a third-degree felony as I have
described it to you, which occurred at 73 East 400
South, in Salt lake County, State of Utah, on or
- 11 -

about March 4, 1983, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 5, Section 105, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, in that you, Jerry Lee Velarde,
attempted to commit mayhem upon Michael S. Terry
by unlawfully and intentionally depriving
Michael S. Terry of a member of his body, to wit:
an ear, and/or by unlawfully and intentionally
slitting the ear of Michael S. Terry, what now is
your plea? Guilty or not guilty?
TP at 4.

See Addendum B.

Although the Court made a finding that

the guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made and that Mr. Velarde
was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or suffered from a
mental disability at the time he entered his plea, he did not make a
finding that Mr. Velarde understood the nature and elements of the
charge.2

Nor did the trial judge ascertain whether Mr. Velarde

understood or make a finding that Mr. Velarde understood that the
State had the burden of proving all elements beyond a reasonable
doubt or the fact that the plea was an admission to all of the
elements of Attempted Mayhem.

Ld.

Hence, the trial judge accepted

the plea in violation of Rule 11(e)(4).
Rule 11(e)(5) requires that the defendant know the
possible sentencing consequences and that the trial judge make
findings to that effect.

No such findings were made in this case,

and while the trial judge did inform Mr. Velarde that he could
impose consecutive sentences, there was no discussion concerning the
effect of a reversal of the murder conviction.

2

As outlined in the

As discussed infra in subpoint 2 at 12, the affidavit
Mr. Velarde signed does not outline the facts and therefore did not
establish that Mr. Velarde understood the nature of the crime he was
pleading to, the elements the State must prove, and the relationship
of the facts in his case to that crime.

- 12 -

Statement of Facts at 1-2, Mr. Velarde entered his guilty plea to
Attempted Mayhem believing it would have little impact on his
sentence.

Because the record does not establish that Mr. Velarde

understood the full consequences of his plea, the trial court
accepted the plea in violation of Rule 11(e).
Because the trial judge accepted the plea in violation of
Rule 11(e), good cause for withdrawal of the guilty plea existed,
and the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Mr. Velarde's
motion to withdraw his plea.
2. The Warner-Brooks Test Requires
Reversal of the Trial Judge's Denial of
Mr. Velarde's Motion to Withdraw His
Guilty Plea.
In Vasilacopulos, this Court reversed the trial court's
denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on
the trial court's failure to establish that the defendant understood
the possibility of consecutive sentences. J[cL at 94. This Court
states that in Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court outlined a standard
which required stricter compliance with the provisions of Rule 11(e)
than the standard which had been followed in Warner, Brooks and
Miller.

Because Vasilacopulos entered his plea on February 17,

1984, prior to the decision in Gibbons, this Court applied what it
called the "Warner-Brooks test" and determined "whether the record
as a whole affirmatively establishes defendant entered his plea with
full knowledge and understanding of its consequences, namely the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences."
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94. When this Court reviewed the record
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as a whole, it determined that the record "does not affirmatively
establish defendant's full knowledge and understanding of the
consequences of his plea under Rule 11(e)(5).n

J[d. at 95.

Mr. Velarde entered his plea on January 24, 1984,
approximately three weeks before Mr. Vasilacopulos entered his
pleas.

In the event Gibbons is inapplicable to Mr. Velarde's case,

the "Warner-Brooks" review of the record as a whole test is
nevertheless applicable.

Applying that test to the entry of

Mr. Velarde's plea of guilty of Attempted Mayhem establishes that
the trial judge violated Rule 11(e) and the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in accepting Mr. Velarde's plea.
As outlined in subpoint 1, supra, the trial judge did not
discuss with Mr. Velarde the constitutional rights he was waiving
nor the nature and elements of the crime to which he was pleading
guilty.

A review of the affidavit signed by Mr. Velarde does little

to remedy this deficit (see Addendum C ) .
Rule 11(e)(4) and due process require that a defendant
understand the nature and elements of the offense to which he is
pleading guilty and the relationship of the facts in the defendant's
case to the law.

As previously outlined, the trial judge did not

discuss with Mr. Velarde the elements necessary to prove Attempted
Mayhem nor the specific facts in his case supporting such a
conviction.

Instead, the judge read the amended Information (R. 10,

TP. 4 ) , then asked Mr. Velarde for a plea.
The affidavit does not establish that Mr. Velarde
understood the elements required to prove Attempted Mayhem.
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In the

affidavit, under the "Elements" section, the following language was
inserted:
Def. (sic) attempted to unlawfully and
intentionally deprive Michael S. Terry of a member
of his body.
(R. 16). The elements as listed in the affidavit do not clarify
what act by the defendant is necessary to establish Attempted Mayhem.
The lines in the affidavit where the facts should have
been listed are blank (R. 16). Hence, the affidavit does not
clarify what Mr. Velarde had done nor how those facts fit together
in support of the charge.
Mayhem is a somewhat unusual crime that requires specific
egregious injury to the victim.

The average person may well not

understand the differences among Assault, a Class B misdemeanor;
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony; Attempted Mayhem, a third
degree felony; and Mayhem, a second degree felony.

Both the due

process clause and Rule 11(e) require that a defendant be fully
informed as to what he did and how that fits within the elements of
the crime to which he is pleading.

In this instance, the record as

a whole does not establish that Mr. Velarde understood the nature
and elements of the crime of Attempted Mayhem nor the nature of his
actions in relationship to that crime.
Nor does the record as a whole establish that Mr. Velarde
understand the full consequences of his guilty plea.

As previously

outlined, the trial judge did not discuss the impact of a reversal
of the murder conviction on Mr. Velarde's sentence nor does the
affidavit clarify that point.

Hence, the trial judge accepted the
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plea in violation of Rule 11(e)(5).
Nor does the record as a whole establish that the judge
made the required findings under Rule 11(e)(3), (4) and (5),
including the defendant's knowledge of the right outlined in
Rule 11(e)(3), the defendant's understanding of the nature and
elements of the crime to which he pled, and the State's burden of
proof.
Because the trial court accepted the guilty plea in
violation of Rule 11(e) and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the trial judge abused his discretion in denying
Mr. Velarde's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Velarde respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of
guilty to Attempted Mayhem and remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 2. *
s

day of December, 1988.

~2&?<&^_^

C^2&^^

:>

MANNY GARCIA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, MANNY GARCIA, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South
500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 and four copies to
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114 this ~x*

day of December, 1988.

^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ <f^S~<—-^
MANfcY GARCIA

DELIVERED by
this

day of December, 1988.
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ADDENDUM A

1

THAT HE INDEED ADMITTED TO CRIMINAL H O M I C I D E ,

2

HE HAS ADMITTED

3

CHANGING STATE OF MIND COULD BRING HIM BEFORE T H I S COURT,

4

KNOW.

5

WOULD ESSENTIALLY VOID ANY GUILTY

6

I N THE STATE COURTS OF UTAH, AND SAY T H I S

7

OF F A I T H FOR THE COURT TO DO.

8
9

BUT,

IN THIS

MANSLAUGHTER,

CASE TO ATTEMPTED MAYHEM THAT

THE OPERATIVE EFFECT TO SAY GIBBONS

MR. GARCIA:

AND SO I

SUBMIT

PLEA ENTERED

IT,

IS

IS

HIS
I

DON'T

RETROACTIVE

INTO FROM GIBBONS

TOO GREAT A LEAP

JUDGE.

I AM NOT TALKING

ABOUT H I S CHANGE OF STATE OF MIND SO MUCH, BUT THE CHANGE OF

10

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE ENORMOUS I N T H I S

11

JERRY'S

12

THIS

13

REVERSED ON APPEAL AND GOES —

14

WITH GUILT OR INNOCENCE AT THAT T I M E .

POINT OF V I E W ,

UNFORESEEABLE,

CASE,

I

AND FROM

FOR HE WAS NOT TOLD THAT

THING COULD BE THROWN INTO A BIG MESS I F

15

ENTER A PLEA,

T H I S CASE

IS

HAS NOTHING TO DO

SUPPOSE THE STATE WAS READY TO GO FORWARD AT THAT

16

TIME,

17

THAT CHARGE NOW BECAUSE THE REASON THAT HE ENTERED THE PLEA

18

I S NO LONGER

19

AS

SO THEY SHOULD JUST —

WE'RE ASKING HE HAVE A T R I A L ON

REAL.

THE COURT:

I

THOUGHT ABOUT THE RETROACTIVE

BECAUSE I T WAS ABOUT F I V E

21

GIBBONS

22

ARGUMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF T H I S CASE,

23

THE O P I N I O N THAT THE MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED AT T H I S

24

BASED ON STATE'S ARGUMENTS AND WITH REGARD TO RETROACTIVE AND

25

THE CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING THE ENTRY OF THE PLEA AT THE

1987,

JUNE,

SO THAT'S

HE ENTERED H I S

ABOUT GIBBONS,

20

IS

YEARS AGO.

--

LAST YEAR.

--

REVIEWING YOUR

THE COURT I S OF

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
•=20 'EARNS BUILDING
SALT i.i-'z CITY UTAH 84101

PLEA

TIME

TIME.

10

ADDENDUM B

2

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JANUARY 2k,

19$4

9:30 A.M.
—OO0OO--

THE COURT:

JERRY LEE VELARDE?

MR. VALDEZ:

THAT'S MY MATTER, YOUR HONOR.

THAT

IS SET FOR A CHANGE OF PLEA.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED

PLEA?
MR. VALDEZ:

PLEA TO A THIRD DEGREE, ATTEMPTED.

THE COURT:

ATTEMPTED MAYHEM?

THIRD DEGREE,

ATTEMPED MAYHEM?
IS YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT NAME JERRY LEE VELARDE?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES, SIR.
HAVE YOU GONE OVER YOUR

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE WAIVER THEREOF AS SET FORTH IN
YOUR AFFIDAVIT?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES, SIR.
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS THAT

YOU ARE WAIVING?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES, SIR.

ANY QUESTIONS YOU WOULD CARE TO ASK

THE COURT WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR THE
WAIVER THEREOF?
MR. VELARDE:

NO, SIR.

J

THE COURT:

HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE TO

YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER A PLEA?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE AS

TO WHAT THE COURT WOULD DO ON SENTENCING IN THIS CASE?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
HAS THERE BEEN ANY THREATS, DURESS OR

ANY OTHER UNDUE INFLUENCE EXERTED ON YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER
A PLEA?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
BY ENTERING A PLEA TO THE INCLUDED

OFFENSE, THAT CARRIES OF SENTENCE OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN
THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY AND/OR A FINE NOT TO EXCEED
$5,000.

BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU DO, IN FACT, ADMIT

THE ACTS THAT SUPPORT THAT CHARGE.
HOW OLD ARE YOU?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

28, SIR.
DO YOU READ AND WRITE THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES.
HAVE HIM EXECUTE THE AFFIDAVIT.

ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANY
DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
DO YOU FEEL YOU HAVE ANY PHYSICAL OR

4

MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH YOUR FREE
CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

NO, SIR.
ARE YOU FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY

ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY AT THIS TIME?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES.
ALL RIGHT.

TO THE INCLUDED OFFENSE

OF ATTEMPTED MAYHEM, A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY AS I HAVE
DESCRIBED IT TO YOU, WHICH OCCURRED AT 73 EAST <+00 SOUTH, IN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON OR ABOUT MARCH if, 1983,
IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 105, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THAT YOU, JERRY LEE VELARDE,
ATTEMPTED TO COMMIT MAYHEM UPON MICHAEL S. TERRY BY
UNLAWFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY DEPRIVING MICHAEL S. TERRY OF A
MEMBER OF HIS BODY, TO WIT: AN EAR, AND/OR BY UNLAWFULLY AND
INTENTIONALLY SLITTING THE EAR OF MICHAEL S. TERRY,
IS YOUR PLEA?

WHAT NOW

GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY?

MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

GUILTY.
PLEA OF GUILTY IS RECEIVED, AND THE

COURT FINDS THAT IT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE BY THE
DEFENDANT, THAT HE IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, NOR HAS A
PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH
HIS FREE CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA.
I BASE THOSE FINDINGS ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE

5

DEFENDANT HERE IN THE COURTROOM, TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS
THAT WERE PUT TO HIM AND HIS RESPONSES THERETO.
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED IN NOT LESS THAN
TWO NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS.
MR. VALDEZ:

WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE?

WE WOULD WAIVE THE MINIMUM TIME,

YOUR HONOR, AND ASK YOU SENTENCE HIM TODAY.
THE COURT:

YOU UNDERSTAND, BY BEING SENTENCED

TODAY, I WOULD COMMIT YOU TO THE PENITENTIARY?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:
YOU BE SENTENCED TO —

YES, SIR.
IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT

ARE YOU OUT AT THE PENITENTIARY NOW?

MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES, I AM.
I NEGLECTED TO TELL YOU, THEN —

WASN'T AWARE OF THAT —

I

I CAN ALLOW THAT TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY

OR CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING
OUT THERE.
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?
MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

YES.

WHAT ARE YOU SERVING OUT THERE?

MR. VELARDE:
THE COURT:

FIVE TO LIFE.
IT WILL RUN CONCURRENTLY.

I WILL

SENTENCE YOU TO ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN THE UTAH STATE
PENITENTIARY.

COMMITMENT WILL ISSUE FORTHWITH, AND I WILL

ALLOW IT TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE FIVE TO LIFE SENTENCE
YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING.
MR. VALDEZ:

THANK YOU.
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In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
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THE STATE OF UTAH.

¥

0

Oeoutv Clerk

Affidavit of Defendant
Criminal No.

I have received a copy of the charge (Jnformatij ) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a
(Degree of Felony

Class of Misdemea;
?

and understand the punishment for this crime may be
. prison term.

M^

V& ^fotfif

. fine, or both.
both J am not on druj

My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney
who has explained my rights to me and 1 understand them.
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should 1 desire.
2. 1 know that if 1 wish to have a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if 1 choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held
against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that I have arightnot to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose
to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered.
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me.

